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LET’S TALK ABOUT SEX: DEFINING ‘SEXUALLY
ORIENTED OR SEXUALLY STIMULATING’
MATERIAL IN SEX OFFENDER
BEHAVIORAL CONTRACTS
Ricardo F. Roybal*

INTRODUCTION
Sex offenders are perceived to be the “scourge of modern America, the
irredeemable monsters that prey on the innocent.”1 As this quote indicates, sex
offenders are painted by society with a single, rough brush. This view, facilitated by
a handful of high-profile sexual assaults involving children in the early 1990’s, led
to legislative action.2
In New Mexico, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(“SORNA”)3 requires individuals convicted of a sex crime to comply with various
restrictions specified in “Sex Offender Supervision Behavioral Contracts.”4 Among
the limitations in these sex offender contracts is a ban on viewing or possessing any
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” materials.5
In State of New Mexico v. Dinapoli,6 the New Mexico Court of Appeals
addressed the constitutionality of this provision in a sex offender contract. In the
case, the sex offender, Robert Dinapoli, was deemed to have violated this provision
because he possessed three mainstream DVDs—the American and Swedish versions
of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo, and a third film titled I Spit on Your Grave.
* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2017. Thank you Professor Dawinder Sidhu
for the thoughtful feedback and invaluable instruction you provided. My thanks also extend to Corinne
Mack, Felecia Cantwell, and the rest of the New Mexico Law Review staff and board members for their
insightful comments that enabled this Note to serve its purpose to resolve an issue within a sensitive area
of law. In particular, a special thanks to Dominic A. Martinez for the countless and continuous
contributions he provided to maximize the quality of this Note. Above all, I would like to thank my family
for the tremendous guidance and never ending support that they have supplied at throughout my
educational career.
1. See Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interested in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and
Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1167 (1999).
2. See generally Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past,
Present, & Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3 (2008),
http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/nejccc/vol34/1/logan.pdf.
3. See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 6, 86 P.3d 1050; see also NMSA 1978 § 29-11(A)-1
(1995) (amended 1999) (explaining that that the statute “may be cited as the ‘Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act’”).
4. See Sex Offender Supervision Behavioral Contract, in N.M. CORRS. DEP’T, PPD SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION,
TRACKING
AND
SUPERVISION,
[hereinafter
Behavioral
Contract],
http://cd.nm.gov/policies/docs/CD-053200.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
5. See Behavioral Contract, supra note 4, § 3(A). This Note separates the terms “sexually oriented”
and “sexually stimulating” because the court interprets the terms independently.
6. 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 1, 350 P.3d 1259.
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Dinapoli objected on the grounds that the he was deprived of notice due to the broad
and vague structure of the violated term.7 The Court of Appeals rejected this
argument and accordingly ruled that Dinapoli was afforded proper notice and
dismissed the contention that the condition was overly broad or vague.8 This Note
focuses on this issue and aims to resolve it.
This Note argues that the provision prohibiting “sexually oriented or
sexually stimulating” materials in Section 6(A) of the New Mexico sex offender
contract is overbroad and impermissibly vague.9 As a result, this provision is prone
to arbitrary and biased decision-making, and fails to provide proper notice to the
offender as to what conduct it prohibits.
Part I provides an overview of specialized conditions of release, sex
offender contracts, and the “sexually stimulating or sexually stimulating” provision.
The history and development of sex offender sentences will be discussed. It also
analyzes the purpose of specialized conditions of release, namely to promote public
safety and reduce offender recidivism. This part will conclude by analyzing New
Mexico v. Green,10the state’s seminal case regarding specialized conditions of
release.
Part II closely examines the recent case of New Mexico v. Dinapoli.11 In
particular, it summarizes the facts of the case, the District Court’s decision, and the
Court of Appeals’ ruling.
Part III argues that the phrase “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” is
over-inclusive and is subject to arbitrary enforcement. To prevent cases like
Dinapoli, courts should provide a more definite standard to apply to specialized
conditions than the reasonableness standard employed in Dinapoli. Accordingly, this
Note aims to achieve two ends (1) to propose a definition that separates and
individually defines “sexually oriented” and “sexually stimulating”; and (2) to
supply probation officers with a guideline to that can be used to make enforcement
of the condition more efficient and consistent.
This Note identifies the notice and enforcement issues that were raised in
Dinapoli and introduces a solution that will prevent similar issues from occurring in
the future. The solution separates the terms “sexually oriented” and “sexually
stimulating” to provide clear notice of its effect but it also narrows the wide range of
materials it previously covered. Most importantly, the definition furthers the purpose
behind specialized conditions of release at no expense to the strength of intended
practice of the prohibition clauses. Alternatively, this definition will ensure that
offenders are not unjustly stripped of their probation sentence because notice was
not provided. Finally, and importantly, this definition prevents sex offenders from
exploiting the uncertainty and gray area that the existing condition contains. Thus,
the proposed definition will protect the public and provide the offender with a full
and fair opportunity to rehabilitate and reintegrate back into society.
7. Id. ¶¶ 28, 33.
8. Id. ¶¶ 1, 8.
9. See Behavioral Contract, supra note 4, § 6(A) (“I will not purchase, possess or subscribe to any
sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material. This includes, but is not limited to: Sexual devices,
books, magazines, video/audio tapes, pictures, DVDs, CD ROMs, and Internet websites.”).
10. 2015-NMCA-007, 341 P.3d 10.
11. 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 1.
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UNDERSTANDING SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING IN NEW
MEXICO: SUPERVISED RELEASE CONDITIONS AND
SEX OFFENDER CONTRACTS

New Mexico’s Implementation of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act

In the early 1990’s, a series of high-profile sex crimes put sex offenders at
the forefront of policy change.12 A 1994 New Jersey case fueled this change.13 This
gruesome case involved a repeat sex offender who abducted, sexually abused, and
murdered 7-year old Megan Kanka.14 In short order, Congress enacted the Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children Act and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Act, which provided federal guidelines and incentives for States to develop and
implement sex offender registration programs.15 Two years later, Congress amended
this statute and renamed it “Megan’s Law.”16 Under this law, states are required to
provide community notification of sex offenders that are registered in their state.17
New Mexico adopted its version of Megan’s Law in 1995, which is now
titled the “Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act” (SORNA).18 SORNA’s
purpose is to “assist law enforcement agencies’ efforts to protect their
communities.”19 Under SORNA, criminals convicted of a sex crime are obligated to
register as sex offenders in the state and comply with notification laws that inform
the public of their status.20 Upon being released from a deferred sentence, sex
offenders receive specialized conditions of release that serve to carry out the purpose
of SORNA.
B.

Specialized Conditions of Release and Sex Offender Behavioral Contracts

Specialized conditions of release are imposed when the probationer is
released from prison.21 If a district court defers imposition of a sentence for a sex
offender, or suspends all or any portion of a sentence for a sex offender, the sex
offender is required to serve an indeterminate period of supervised probation for not
less than five years and up to the natural life of the offender.22 Before being placed
on probation, the district court provides the sex offender with a hearing to determine

12. Logan, supra note 2, at 5.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (1994); see also 42 U.S.C.A § 16902 (2006) (amending the Wetterling
Act and establishing the Jacob Wetterling, Megan Nicole Kanka, and Pam Lychner Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Program).
16. Megan’s Law, LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Megan’s+Law
(last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
17. Logan, supra note 2, at 5.
18. NMSA 1978, § 29-11A-1 (1995).
19. NMSA 1978, § 29-11A-2(B) (1995).
20. See Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶¶ 19, 21.
21. See generally NMSA 1978, § 31-21-10.1 (2007).
22. See § NMSA 1978, 31-21-10.1(A) (2007).
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the terms and conditions required to complete the term of supervised probation.23
During the hearing, the district court may consider factors such as the “nature and
circumstances of the offense” for which the offender was convicted, the “nature and
circumstance of a prior sex offense,” if any, “efforts engaged in by the sex offender,”
and the “danger to the community” posed by the sex offender.24 Ultimately, the
district court is able to subject the sex offender to reasonable terms and conditions
of probation. Two of these conditions include “being subject to intensive supervision
by a probation officer of the corrections department” and “participating in an
outpatient or inpatient sex offender treatment program.”25
The New Mexico Corrections Department requires the offender to sign a
Sex Offender Behavioral Contract (sex offender contract), which is composed of
specialized conditions of release.26 The probation officer is charged with ensuring
that the sex offender complies with obligations within the sex offender contract. This
contract includes eight sections that require the offender to maintain continual
communication with the department, while also restricting his conduct.27 These
conditions are not always clear and sometimes lead to courtroom disputes about
constitutionality as evidenced by the following case.
In a case decided before Dinapoli, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
interpreted constitutional issues arising from language within sex offender
behavioral contracts. In State v. Green,28 the defendant was released from prison after
serving five years in prison and was subsequently put on probation. The defendant
was originally sentenced to nineteen years in prison but the rest of the term was
suspended by the district court.29 Within months of his release, however, the trial
court ordered the defendant to serve the rest of his sentence in prison, which included
a one-year habitual offender enhancement.30 The probation violation report
contained multiple infractions, including one that directly prohibited the possession
of sexual images on his laptop.31 The violation occurred after the defendant’s
probation officer visited his home and found a photo of a nude woman, as well other
nude images, on the defendant’s computer.32

23. See § NMSA 1978, 31-21-10.1(B) (2007).
24. Id.
25. See NMSA 1978, § 31-21-10.1(D)(1–2) (2007).
26. The sex offender behavioral contract was implemented by the New Mexico Corrections
Department as an attempt to better protect the public and rehabilitate sex offenders. See State v Green,
2015-NMCA-007, 341, ¶ 11, P.3d 10 (providing an analysis of how sex offender behavioral contracts are
mandated in New Mexico); see also John Bigelow, Increasing Public safety in New Mexico, During and
After Incarceration: New Directions for Reform in New Mexico Corrections, GOVERNOR RICHARDSON’S
TASK
FORCE
ON
PRISON
REFORM,
1
(2008),
http://www.bhc.state.nm.us/pdf/200808/PrisonReformTaskForceFinalReproductiontoCD.pdf (describing
the rationale for changing sentencing schemes in New Mexico due to population increases in New
Mexico).
27. See Behavioral Contract, supra note 4, § 3(B).
28. 2015-NMCA-007, 341 P.3d 10.
29. Id. ¶ 1.
30. Id.
31. Id. ¶ 21.
32. Id. ¶ 24.
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On appeal, the defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence from
the record to support his probation being revoked.33 Specifically, the defendant
contended that this condition (prohibiting the possession of sexual images) was
overly vague such that a “reasonable person would not have known that the nude
images would be considered pornography.”34 The court held that the State met its
burden of showing that a reasonable and impartial mind would believe that the
defendant violated the terms of probation, and that the district court did not abuse its
discretion.35 The court reasoned that when the defendant signed the sex offender
contract he acknowledged that he read and understood these additional supervision
conditions.36 This included a condition that prohibited the defendant from possessing
any “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material.”37 The defendant’s probation
officer testified that he reviewed the conditions with the defendant and specifically
informed him that probation officers would monitor his computer and can search it
at any time for “pornography” or “sexually explicit material.”38 Moreover, the court
noted that “sexually explicit exhibition” has been defined as a “graphic and
unequivocal display or portrayal of nudity or sexual activity.”39 Similarly, the State’s
Legislature has defined “sexual conduct” to include “act[s] of masturbation . . .
physical contact with a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks,
or, if such person be female, breasts.”40 Accordingly, the court concluded that these
terms all fall within the scope of the term “sexually oriented” in Section 6(A) of the
sex offender contract.”41 The court’s decision was the first to interpret specialized
conditions of release that are included in a sex offender contract.42 Equally important,
it was the State’s first case regarding sex offender probationary release to approach
the issue of defining the phrase “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” material.
II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE: STATE V. DINAPOLI

Factual Background and Court Opinion

Robert J. Dinapoli was on probation for two sex crimes that he pleaded
guilty to in the early 1990’s. The first sex crime took place on June 30, 1990, when
Dinapoli, while armed with a firearm, broke into the home of two women and
sexually assaulted them.43 Dinapoli pleaded guilty, and as a result, he was sentenced

33. Id. ¶ 21.
34. Id. ¶¶ 8, 21.
35. Id. ¶ 22.
36. Id. ¶ 23.
37. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 4, State v. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, 350 P.3d 1259 (No.
33,004).
38. Green, 2015-NMCA-007, ¶ 23.
39. Id. ¶ 25.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. To the best of my knowledge, New Mexico is the only state that uses the term “sex offender
behavioral contract” to describe the explicit agreement to adhere to specialized conditions of release.
43. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 2.
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to thirty years imprisonment followed by five years of probation, and was compelled
to participate in inpatient and outpatient treatment.44
The second sex crime occurred on October 3, 1991, before Dinapoli was
charged with the first offense.45 Dinapoli was charged with sexual assault of a
woman, attempted criminal sexually penetration, kidnapping, and false
imprisonment.46 As part of a plea and disposition agreement,47 Dinapoli was
sentenced to serve 364 days in custody followed by five years’ probation.48 Dinapoli
began his sentence for both crimes in 1994.49
Upon serving 14 years in prison, Dinapoli was released into the care of the
New Mexico Behavioral Health Institute in Las Vegas, New Mexico.50 Dinapoli was
unconvinced that this rehabilitative program was appropriate for him and quit after
two days.51 Dinapoli insisted that he was not fit for the rehabilitation program and
could not be around the other people at the Institute.52 Dinapoli communicated to his
probation officer that he was responsible for raping two women and should be in
prison.53 Dinapoli was certain that he would not be able to function outside of
prison.54 The district court was then forced to revoke Dinapoli’s probation and
consequently sent him back to prison to serve six years in prison followed by five
years of probation.55
Dinapoli was released from prison three years, but this time he was
permitted to live at his mother’s house due to a degenerative neurological disorder.56
Dinapoli also signed a sex offender behavioral contract on December 2, 2011.57
Three months later, Dinapoli was arrested for violating two conditions under this sex
offender contract.58 The first was a violation of Section 6(D), which prohibited
Dinapoli from accessing electronic devices for sexually stimulating material,
pornography, adult websites, and social networking sites.59 Dinapoli’s probation

44. Id. ¶ 3.
45. Id. ¶ 2.
46. Id.
47. Rule 9-408 NMRA.
48. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 3.
49. Id. ¶ 2.
50. Id. ¶ 4.
51. Id.
52. See id. ¶ 4 (providing Dinapoli’s statement that “treatment was of no value to him and [he] wished
to be returned to prison where he did not have to put up with anyone asking questions about his past
behavior”).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. ¶ 4.
56. Id. ¶ 5.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. See also Behavioral Contract, supra note 4, § 6(D) (“I understand that any computer, camera,
computer tablet, cell phone, thumb drive (USB drive), memory or any other electronic device I have access
to, including the hard drive and removable drives may be examined for inappropriate content at any time.
Inappropriate content includes, but is not limited to: Sexually stimulating material, Pornography (adult
or child), adult websites, social networking sites, such as, but not limited to Facebook, MySpace and
Mocospace, dating websites, and personal ads to include cell phone application.”).
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officer stated that he accessed websites that depicted rape victims and rapists because
“he wanted to learn more about what kind of rapist he was.”60
The second violation occurred because Dinapoli was asked to leave his
treatment meeting for being disruptive.61 The State filed a motion to revoke his
probation and held a probation meeting on April 5, 2012.62 The district court,
however, reinstated Dinapoli’s probation with an additional condition that prohibited
him from accessing the Internet with his cell phone.63
Dinapoli was found to be in possession of three prohibited DVDs only four
months later, which threatened to revoke his probation revocation.64 The DVDs were
discovered by his probation officer and were found in Dinapoli’s bedroom.65 The
DVDs included the American and Swedish versions of The Girl with the Dragon
Tattoo, as well as I spit on your Grave.66 Dinapoli’s probation officer, discovered the
DVDs and considered them to be “extremely violent and sexually graphic in nature,
and portray women being raped.”67 Dinapoli’s probation officer determined that the
DVDs were prohibited under Section 6(A) of the sex offender contract.68 Section
6(A) reads as follows:
I will not purchase, possess or subscribe to any sexually oriented
or sexually stimulating material. This includes, but is not limited
to: Sexual devices, books, magazines, video/audio tapes, pictures,
DVDs, CD ROMs, and Internet websites.69
The State received a report of these findings and accordingly filed a motion
to revoke Dinapoli’s probation.70 Ultimately, the district court found that Dinapoli
violated Section 6(A) of the sex offender contract and revoked his probation. The
district court then committed Dinapoli to the Department of Corrections for a term
of five years and tacked on another five years of probation to follow upon his
release.71
In making its decision, the district court was shown clips from the three
DVDs that were found in Dinapoli’s possession.72 The State played scenes from both
versions of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo.73 Dinapoli’s probation officer testified
in court and described the scenes in the Swedish version depicting a woman being
anally raped, and an oral sex scene that takes place in an office setting.74 The
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶¶ 6, 9.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
See Behavioral Contract, supra note 4, § 6(a).
Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 6.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
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probation officer also stated that the American version included an oral sex scene
and was very similar to the Swedish version.75
Additionally, the State viewed print content on the DVD covers. On the
back of the American version of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo the cover read
“Rated R for brutal, violent content, including rape and torture, strong sexuality, and
graphic nudity.”76 I Spit on your Grave, summarized the movie as “A group of local
lowlifes subject the star of the movie to a nightmare of degradation, rape, and
violence.”77
Dinapoli explained that he watched the movies because of the revenge that
the rape victims were able to impose upon their rapists.78 He testified that he did not
receive any type of sexual satisfaction from watching the movies and that he believed
the sex offender contract to solely prohibited pornography.79 Dinapoli explained that
he was not cautioned to avoid scenes that were found in these types of mainstream
videos.80
On appeal, Dinapoli put forth multiple arguments about why his probation
should not be revoked, but the Court of Appeals did not find any of them to be
persuasive. First, Dinapoli argued that he did not have sufficient notice from the sex
offender contract or the February violation that possession of the DVDs would
violate the terms of his probation.81 Section 6(A) of the sex offender contract
prohibited Dinapoli from possessing any “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating”
material. The court explained that the relevant inquiry was whether the DVDs were
either “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating.”82 The court looked to see whether
a reasonable person would determine that the DVDs fell into the “sexually oriented
or sexually oriented” category.83 In short order, the court dismissed Dinapoli’s
subjective point that he did not receive any sexual gratification from the movies. The
court determined that the text on the DVD covers coupled with the graphic scenes
that were presented, would put a reasonable person on notice that the DVDs were
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” in violation of Section 6(A) of the sex
offender contract.84 The court found no value or relevance in regard to the DVDs’
mainstream nature and availability.85
Second, Dinapoli contended that Section 6(A) was limited to “adult” or
“pornographic” material when read in conjunction with other provisions of the sex
offender contract.86 The court noted that Section 6(D) of the contract prohibits
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 18.
See id. ¶ 19 (providing other provisions of the contract, including the following:
I understand that any computer, camera, computer tablet, cell phone, thumb drive (USB
drive), memory or any other electronic device I have access to, including the hard drive
and removable drives may be examined for inappropriate content at any time.
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Dinapoli from accessing “inappropriate content” on “any electronic device.”87
However, this condition was not defined in the contract.88 The court determined that
“inappropriate content” encompasses “sexually stimulating” material.89 Through the
application of the ejusdem generis,90 the sex offender contract intends to embrace
“pornography” and the other listed items in the same manner as “stimulating
material.”91 The court concluded that by use of ejusdem generis, the term
“inappropriate material” stated in Section 6(D) of the sex offender contract clearly
includes “sexually oriented” material in its scope.92 The term “sexually oriented or
sexually stimulating” is synonymous in the context of the sex offender contract and
are treated in a similar fashion.93 The court, however, noted that Section 6(D)’s
incorporation of “sexually stimulating” and “pornography” did not intend to make
the terms interchangeable, but noted that the two could overlap.94 Using this line of
reasoning, the court held that Section 6(A) of the sex offender contract is not limited
to “adult” or “pornographic” material when read in conjunction with other provisions
of the sex offender contract.95
Third, Dinapoli argued that the conditions within the sex offender contract
were vague and overly broad because they did not provide sufficient notice that the
possession of mainstream movies was prohibited and in effect, gave rise to the risk
of arbitrary enforcement by probation officers.96 The court contended that the sex
offender contract was necessarily broad to accomplish it purpose, which is to prevent
the Defendant from possessing material that may lead to recurring criminal activity

Inappropriate content includes, but is not limited to: Sexually stimulating material,
Pornography (adult or child), adult websites, social networking sites, such as, but not
limited to Facebook, Myspace and Mocospace, dating websites, and personal ads to
include cell phone applications.
Section 6(D)
I will not patronize any establishment in which sexually oriented material or
entertainment is available. Including, but not limited to: adult book/video stores, and
topless/nude clubs.
Section 6(F)
I understand that I may be asked to provide my telephone, satellite television, or cable
bill for examination. Prohibited charges on these bills include: calls to adult hotlines,
and adult channels.
Section 6(G)).
87. Id. ¶ 20.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“[Latin “of the same kind or class”]
A canon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general
word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed.”).
91. See Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 20 (stating that, under the statutory construction principle of
ejusdem generis, when words with a general meaning follow words with a more specific meaning, “the
general words are not construed in their widest extent but are instead construed as applying to persons or
things of the same kind of class as those specifically mentioned.”) (quoting State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC050, ¶ 21, 147 N.M. 182, 218, P.3d 868).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. ¶ 22.
95. Id. ¶ 19.
96. Id. ¶ 28.
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or hinder his rehabilitation.97 The court held that the sex offender contract was not
impermissibly vague such as to have denied Dinapoli notice.98 The court explained
that the phrase “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” could be gleaned from
case law and statute.99 The court also found that Dinapoli had additional notice of
the prohibited conduct by virtue of his hearing in February.100
Fourth, Dinapoli argued that the sex offender contract violated his First
Amendment rights.101 The court held that by “prohibiting the Defendant from
possessing sexually oriented material, the sex offender contract addressed both the
need to deter [him] from reoffending and the effort to bolster his rehabilitation.”102
The court declared that probation is an act of clemency or leniency, and the
conditions therein are meant to serve the public.103 Adding that “probation is not a
matter of right,” but rather, it is a criminal sanction and the district court may impose
reasonable conditions that constrain some freedoms normally enjoyed by lawabiding citizens.104
Finally, Dinapoli argued that the district court should have watched the
movies in their entirety so that the scenes selected by the State could be interpreted
in context.105 The court first dismissed Dinapoli’s attempt to bring both Rule 11-106
and the constitutional test for obscenity, noting that neither of the two apply to
probation hearings.106 Instead, the court reiterated the purpose of probation, which is
to both prevent an offender from engaging in additional criminal activity and to
rehabilitate the offender.107 Further, the court reasoned that it is irrelevant whether
other portions of the DVDs did not contain “sexually oriented” materials or that the
DVDs taken as a whole could be considered “sexually oriented.”108 Thus, the court
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate Dinapoli’s due
process rights by finding that the DVDs met the standard based on the clips of the
movies that were shown in court.109

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 28.
101. Id. ¶ 29.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. ¶¶ 31–34; see also Rule 11-106 NMRA (stating that “if a party introduces all or part of a
writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other
part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
time).
107. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 34.
108. Id. ¶ 35.
109. Id.
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Critique of the Court’s Analysis in State v. Dinapoli

Within the past decade, sex offenders have seen their rights become
severely limited.110 These restraints seek to protect the community, but they also aim
to rehabilitate the offender to ensure successful reintegration back into their
community.111 Critics of these restraints question their effectiveness112 and their onesize-fits-all approach, arguing that they push sex offenders to the fringes of society
regardless of the degree of the sex crime, which could range from molestation of a
child to public urination.113 “Not all people who have been convicted of sex offenses
pose a risk to children, if they pose any risk at all. Blanket residency-restriction laws
disregard that reality.”114 This Note finds itself alongside these arguments by
pointing out the notice and enforcement issues.
This was the primary issue in State v. Dinapoli,115 which decided that the
phrase “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material” provides the offender
with sufficient notice as to what conduct would fall under its reach.116 This Note
argues that Dinapoli117 inadequately addressed the notice and enforcement issues and
puts forth a simple but effective solution that first separates the terms and then
provides a detailed definition for each. This approach will resolve the notice issue by
providing the offender with a comprehensive list of definitions that better articulates
what type of conduct is prohibits. Likewise, these definitions serve as a guideline for
probation officers to ensure that the condition is applied fairly and consistently in
the future.
1.

Notice

Without proper notice, a sex offender might be unable to determine the
exact limitations that the probation conditions provide and his or her liberties may
be severely limited as a result.118 Notice is particularly important at the bargaining
stage, when the offender is presented with the conditions and is asked to fully
comprehend their impact. The prospect of freedom can cloud an offender’s ability to
acknowledge the inherent value of the liberties that the contract waives upon
110. See LISA BROIDY ET AL., PAROLE REVOCATION IN NEW MEXICO, JUSTICE RESEARCH STATISTICS
ASSOCIATION 11, 12 (2010) (explaining that the statute requirement made to NMSA 1978, Section 31-2110.1 in 2004 will impact sex offenders going forward and that offenders eligible for inclusion under this
criteria are just beginning to be released to parole).
111. See Bigelow, supra note 27 (suggesting that policy changes put forth in 2008 aimed at making a
prison sentence a path away from a life of crime, at making our communities safer and at making the
inmate’s first sentence his last).
112. Editorial, The Pointless Banishment of Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/opinion/the-pointless-banishment-of-sex-offenders.html
(last
visited Apr. 7, 2016).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 1.
116. Id. ¶¶ 1, 7.
117. Id. ¶ 1.
118. See Gabriel Gillett, A World Without Internet: A New Framework for Analyzing a Supervised
Release Condition that Restricts Computer and Internet Access, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 217, 248 (2010)
(stating that a prisoner’s rights are best protected when he or she is “fully informed and understands the
potential long-term impacts of any agreement”).
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release.119 Additionally, the large number of conditions within the contract can
present notice issues.120 This is particularly true for people who face mental health
challenges, or lack education.121
The current approach assumes that an average sex offender is able to
understand the conditions well enough to determine what conduct is and is not
prohibited by the contract without a proper definition. Because the sex offender in
Dinapoli’s position is unable to determine what constitutes a violation of his
probation, his protected interest in his probationary status is violated.122 As the
United States Supreme Court has previously noted:
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we
assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,
so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent
by not providing fair warning.123
In State v. Dinapoli,124 the Court of Appeals spent a large portion of the
opinion discussing notice. Dinapoli contended that his probation officer did not tell
him he could not possess the type of movies he had. He testified, for example, that
he “assumed, foolishly, that that statement was referring to pornographic films . . .
and pornographic magazines.”125
The court found that a reasonable person would have been on notice that
possession of the three mainstream DVDs would have fallen into the “sexually
oriented or sexually stimulating” category prohibited by the sex offender contract.126
In doing so, the court dismissed Dinapoli’s contention that Section 6(A) of the
contract is limited to “adult” or “pornographic” material when read in conjunction
with other provisions of the contract.127 The court reasoned that Section 6(D) of the
contract defines “inappropriate content” to include both “sexually stimulating”
material and “pornography,” but this does not evidence that the two terms are
119. Id. at 258–59.
120. See Cecelia Klingele, What are we Hoping For? Defining Purpose in Deterrence-Based
Correctional Programs, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1631, 1639 (2014) (expressing that with the amount of
supervised conditions present, it is not a surprise that there are so many violations); see also Cecelia
Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1035
(2013) (providing a probation officers statement, “[M]ost of our violations are technical. . . . I mean, if
you can’t write up a report, and cite at least a technical violation, you’re not really struggling very hard,
because there are so many conditions. There’s got to be something that the guy didn’t do right, right?”).
121. See Klingele, supra note 116, at 1639 (explaining that the “sheer number of requirements makes
compliance with all of them nearly impossible for many probationers, especially those whose ability to
follow directions is already compromised by learning difficulties, mental health challenges, and poor
education”).
122. See State v. Doe, 1986-NMCA-019, ¶ 4, 104 N.M. 107, 717 P.2d 83 (acknowledging that “it is
an essential component of due process that individuals be given fair warning of acts which may lead to
loss of liberty”).
123. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
124. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 15.
125. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 38, at 12.
126. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 17.
127. Id. ¶ 22.

2016

DEFINING VAGUE TERMS IN SEX OFFENDER CONTRACTS

423

interchangeable.128 The court admits that the two terms might overlap, but it would
be unreasonable to assume that the two are full inclusive. Citing older NM case law,
the court explained, “If the intent were to equate sexually stimulating material with
pornography, there would be no reason to list both items.”129
Essentially, Dinapoli’s argument that he, a sex offender, believed that
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” material was synonymous with
“pornography,” was rejected because of prior case law and common knowledge of
contract construction. Sex offenders should not be held to the standard of legal
practitioners when determining whether the offender understood the meaning of a
contract provision.
2.

Arbitrary Enforcement

The conditions within the contract in State v. Dinapoli,130 afford probation
officers with broad discretion to determine what conduct is and is not a violation of
probation. For example, Dinapoli’s probation officer testified, “Whether something
falls within the prohibition [“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating”] is entirely
up to the discretion of the probation officer.”131 Furthermore, in describing what
conduct would lead to a probation violation Dinapoli’s probation officer testified,
“For me, it’s black and white. If it has any kind of sex scene in it, they should not
have it. That’s a violation. That’s the way we’re trained and that’s the way we see it.
They shouldn’t have it.”132 This testimony illustrates the unilateral attempt by the
probation officer to define the term because this “black and white” standard was not
communicated to Dinapoli himself.133 In fact, Dinapoli’s probation officer testified
that the probation officers in her unit regularly share with one another the titles of
popular movies that they believe to be prohibited under Section 6 of the contract,
which apparently includes any number of R-rated mainstream movies containing
“any kind of sex scene.”134 These statements demonstrate that Dinapoli was not
afforded proper notice which denied him the opportunity to comply with the
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” condition. This testimony also indicates
that the probation officers also have trouble interpreting the condition.
Upon release from prison, Sex offenders are required to serve an
indeterminate probation sentence of least five years - without a violation.135 This
creates a perpetual sentencing scheme, under which, a offender might never escape
because the five year requirement resets itself each time an offender’s probation is
revoked. Thusly, arbitrary enforcement, coupled with indeterminate sentences,
eliminates the offender’s ability to control his freedom, and, with that, any trust he
may have had in the justice system. Essentially, the current approach favors the
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Diamond Constr. Co. 2001-NMCA-082, ¶ 19, 131 N.M.
100, 33 P.3d 651 (“[W]e view the contract as a harmonious whole, give meaning to every provision, and
accord each part of the contract its significance in light of other provisions.”)).
130. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 1.
131. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 38, at 22.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See § NMSA 1978, 31-21-10.1(A) (2007).
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justice system, and it might protect the public, but at the expense of sex offender’s
rights.
III.

A.

A SIMPLE BUT EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION TO ELIMINATE
NOTICE ISSUES AND ENSURE FAIR AND CONSISTENT
ENFORCEMENT

Previous Scholarship that Falls Short of Providing a Workable Solution

Other scholars have addressed the issue of notice that arose in Dinapoli, but
the proposed solutions do not eradicate the underlying problem and focus primarily
on the vague nature of the term “pornography.” For example, one scholar proposes
a tailored approach that aims to fashion the specialized conditions of release to the
individual in an attempt to eliminate the disputes over notice.136 The State of New
Mexico already attempts to individualize the specialized conditions of release to the
individual sex offender.137 In spite of these individualized conditions, the notice issue
remains problematic because all sex offenders must comply with the prohibition of
“sexually oriented” or “sexually stimulating” material. The tailored approach would
not resolve the notice issue that this Note is concerned with.
Another proposal is to reconstruct the language within these specialized
conditions of release.138 The justification for this approach is that a sufficiently
specific definition furthers the goal of transitioning a convict from a rigid and
restrictive prison life back into society, where the offender can live a more productive
life.139 A proposed definition for “pornography” reads as follows:
(a)(1) Any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video,
picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture,
whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other
means, of sexually explicit conduct; or (2) any textual material
describing sexually explicit conduct accompanied by visual
depictions of the naked human body, such accompaniment to be
taken from the publication as a whole; and

136. See Laura A. Napoli, Demystifying “Pornography”: Tailoring Special Release Conditions
Concerning Pornography and Sexually Oriented Expression, 11 N.H. L. REV., 69, 90 (2013) (examining
the design of special release conditions and the problems that arise when such conditions do not comport
with constitutional standards).
137. See Description of Community Corrections Program, N.M. CORR. DEP’T PROBATION & PAROLE,
Supervision Conditions & Special Programs, http://cd.nm.gov/ppd/ppd.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2016)
(“Community Corrections Programs primarily serve offenders in the community based on the risk level
and the needs of the offender. These offenders often have greater treatment needs. The Department works
together with the behavioral health collaborative to provide the most suitable behavioral health services
these offenders. Community Corrections programs also serve as a diversionary program for
probation/parole violators who would otherwise likely be incarcerated.”).
138. Michael Smith, Barely Legal: Vagueness and the Prohibition of Pornography as a Condition of
Supervised Release, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 727, 729 (2010) (arguing that a judge violates a probationer’s
right to sufficiently specific conditions of supervised release that provide fair warning and curtail arbitrary
and discriminatory application when he or she imposes a ban on viewing or possessing pornography
because the term lacks a specific legal definition).
139. Id. at 748.
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(b) That a reasonable person could believe is intended to arouse
sexual excitement. (c) “Sexually explicit conduct” is defined as
actual or simulated (1)sexual intercourse, including genitalgenital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between
persons of the same or opposite sex; (2) bestiality; (3)
masturbation; (4) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (5) lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.140
This definition effectively defines conduct that would fall within the reach
of “pornography,” but does not provide a solution for what conduct falls into the
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” category that is used in New Mexico’s
sex offender contracts. The court in State v. Dinapoli ruled that the term
“pornography” and the phrase “sexually oriented and sexually stimulating” are not
synonymous.141 Thus, the question of what conduct falls under the reach of “sexually
oriented and sexually stimulating” material remains.
B.

Providing Separate Definitions for the Terms “Sexually Oriented” and
“Sexually Stimulating” by Using Existing New Mexico Statutes

With the shortcomings of the two previous proposals in mind, this Note
meticulously defines the “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” condition to
prevent future notice and enforcement issues that will continue to arise if no changes
are made. The proposed solution begins by separating the condition to become
“sexually oriented” and “sexually stimulating” to allow for a functional approach to
identifying the clear boundaries for both the offender and probation officer.
The court in State v. Green used existing statutes and ruled that sexually
oriented and sexually stimulating material is sufficiently clear to provide notice that
an image of a naked woman would constitute as a violation of probation.142 Relying
on the Green court’s use of existing case law, the court in Dinapoli also held that
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” under 6(A) was sufficiently clear as to
have provided Dinapoli with notice as to what conduct was prohibited. However, the
standard used by this group of probation officers, deprives the offender, like
Dinapoli, the opportunity to comply with the numerous conditions within the sex
offender contract. Leaving the problem that probation officers are afforded with a
broad discretion to find a violation on what they “think” is a violation as opposed to
what the probationer was notified and understands the condition to mean.
History has revealed that sex offenders are perceived to be by many to be
the epitome of evil and not without justification. Nonetheless, the offender, by virtue
of being charged with a sex offense, is branded a monster and is required to comply
with an innumerable amount of post release conditions. That being the case,
specialized conditions of release function to protect the public and rehabilitate and
eventually reintegrate the offender back into society. Reintegration is only attainable
if the offender is aware of the boundaries that these conditions provide.
This Note puts forth an intelligible proposal to reconstruct and define the
language under Section 6(A) of the sex offender contract. This definition and the
140. Id. at 754–55.
141. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 22.
142. State v. Green, 2015-NMCA-007, ¶ 25, 341 P.3d 10.
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language therein, is influenced by definitions for terms in New Mexico’s Sexual
Exploitation of Children Act.143 The proposed definition reads as follows:
(Section 6) Computers/Electronics/Entertainment
A. I will not “knowingly” purchase, possess or subscribe to
material that is substantially “sexually oriented” or substantially
“sexually stimulating.”
B. Conduct of this type is prohibited in both “visual” and “print”
mediums.
i. “Knowingly” means having general knowledge of, or reason
to know, or reasonable ground for belief in which warrants
further inspection or inquiry or both, of the character and
content of any material described herein, which is reasonably
subject to examination by the defendant;
ii. “Nudity” meaning the showing of the male or female
genitals, pubic area or buttocks, or if such person be female,
breasts.
iii. For purposes of this condition, a “visual” medium is
defined as: any film, photography, negative, slide, computer
diskette, videotape, videodisc or any computer or
electronically generated imagery.
iv. For purposes of this condition, a “print” medium is defined
as: any book, magazine or other form of publication or
photographic reproduction containing or incorporating any
film, photography, negative, slide, computer diskette,
videotape, videodisc or any computer generated or
electronically generated imagery.
v. “Sexually oriented” encompasses the following: Nudity,
sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital,
anal-genital or oral-anal, whether between persons of the
same or opposite sex, bestiality, masturbation,
sadomasochistic abuse, or sexual exhibition with a focus on
the genitals or pubic area of any person.
vi. “Sexually Stimulating” means to cause the offender to be
sexually excited, aroused, or provoked to act on a sexual
desire triggered by the prohibited item regardless of how
obscure or odd the desire. This condition is subjective and
narrow, and should only be used when:
a. A court or probation officer has prohibited a specific
item or source of material, as opposed to a general or
categorical ban;
b. The prohibition is a result of a unique characteristic
that the offender possesses demonstrating a strong
likelihood that he or she will be sexually exited,
aroused, or tempted to act in a sexual manner, when the
prohibited item is present;

143. NMSA 1978, § 30-6A-2 (2015). However, the definition that this Note provides incorporates a
unique organizational scheme and does not adopt the exact terminology found in the cited statutes. This
ensures that the definition is precise and functions as it was originally intended.
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c. The offender is found to be in possession of the
prohibited item; and
d. The offender was notified in advance that this
particular item was prohibited.
This definition resolves the notice issue that was discussed in State v.
Dinapoli,144 for three reasons. First, the proposed definition provides bright lines that
would communicate to the sex offender what conduct would lead to a violation of
probation. Similarly, this definition separates the terms “sexually oriented” and
“sexually stimulating” to allow the offender to understand that the former serves as
a general ban and includes the obvious kinds of materials that are prohibited
regardless of the offender. Alternatively, the offender is informed that the latter
(sexually stimulating) prohibits particular items and materials unique to the
particular profile of the offender.
Second, probation officers will not have broad discretion to self-regulate
the terms of the contract. As a result, arbitrary rulings will be reduced. This will lead
to more and more offenders trusting the justice system. In effect, trust in the justice
system provides an incentive to comply with the conditions of release, because the
offender believes that he is in control of his own fate.
Third, this definition does away with the “any” quantifier that went
immediately before “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” material. In its place
the word “substantially” is inserted. This further limits the opportunity for arbitrary
enforcement and seeks to prevent unintentional probation violations. Section 6(A)
includes a wide range of materials (i.e., books, magazines, photographs) and when
coupled with the “any” quantifier, it creates a blanket prohibition those materials.
For example, if a literary work because one page contains a sentence discussing
sexual intercourse, or a movie contains a two second showing of a woman’s breasts,
then the prior version of the condition could lead to a probation violation. In contrast,
the “substantial” requirement would not find a violation in a situation where the
nudity was not foreseen and not the purpose for possessing it.
In Dinapoli’s case, applying this standard, a violation would have been
upheld. Dinapoli would have been put on notice that these DVDs would constitute
as a violation of probation because the conduct falls under Section 6(A)(B), as a
“visual medium” that includes “sexually oriented” material including
“sadomasochistic abuse” and “genital-anal conduct.” The possession of the three
mainstream DVDs would have been a violation of the proposed condition.
1.

Prohibited vs. non-prohibited materials: putting the proposed
definition of “sexually oriented and sexually stimulating” to use

This section provides illustrations of scenarios where the proposed
definition effectively dichotomizes prohibited and non-prohibited materials.
Admittedly, this demonstration is not exhaustive, but it does demonstrate how this
definition would improve the ability to determine whether a particular item is
prohibited.
First scenario: Playboy the magazine vs. Sports Illustrated, the Swimsuit
Edition. Here, Playboy the Magazine would be prohibited under the proposed
144. 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 1.
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definition because it projects images of nude women and contains discussions about
sexual intercourse. This would serve as “sexually oriented” under Section (6)(A)(B)
as a “print form” (magazine) showing images of “nudity” (female genitals and
breasts) and discusses sexual intercourse. In contrast, Sports Illustrated, the Swimsuit
Edition, would not be prohibited under the proposed definition. Although the
magazine includes women in swimsuits, it does not show the woman’s unclothed
genitals or breasts. The magazine is a general sports magazine and does not devote
articles to sexual intercourse.
That being said, the probation officer does have the ability to prohibit
particular items under the “sexually stimulating” portion of the condition. For
example, if a sex offender was convicted of molesting women in bathing suits at the
beach, then the probation officer could be justified in prohibiting the Swimsuit
Magazine. This would be a justifiable prohibition because the Swimsuit Magazine
depicts women that identify with the offenders criminal profile and victim choice.
Second scenario: Fifty Shades of Grey (book)145 vs. A Game of Thrones
146
(book). The former would be prohibited under the proposed definition because it
contains “sexually oriented” material in the “print form.” Fifty Shades of Grey
contains in-depth descriptions about “sexual intercourse,” “between persons of the
opposite sex.” This serves as an example in which the “substantial” requirement is
satisfied. In contrast, A Game of Thrones devotes very little of its text to discussing
and describing “sexual intercourse.” This would not satisfy the “substantial”
requirement.
Third scenario: Nude Poster vs. Nude Painting or drawing. This example
demonstrates the difference between the mediums that are included in this section.
The nude poster would be covered as an “other form of publication” exhibiting
“nudity” and would be prohibited. But the nude painting, or drawing, would not be
covered by the definition. It would be up to the probation officer or the New Mexico
Corrections Department to craft a condition that prohibits nude paintings or
drawings.
Fourth scenario: A movie containing nudity found in a common living area
vs. a movie with nudity found amongst in an area completely controlled by a sex
offender. This scenario attempts to provide an example about how the intent element
“knowingly” is used. If, for example, a probation officer were to find a copy of “The
Girl with the Dragon Tattoo” in a sex offenders house, but it was shelved alongside
fifty other movies in a common living area shared by other non-sex offenders, then
it is very unlikely that the offender had “knowledge” that the movie was “possessed”
by the sex offender, as is intended by the definition. In contrast, if the probation
officer found the same movie in the sex offender’s bedroom and it was amongst thirty
others, it would constitute as “knowledge” of possession because the offender has
control over the area in question.

145. E. L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES OF GREY (Vintage Books Ed. 2012).
146. GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A GAME OF THRONES (1996).
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CONCLUSION
This Note argues that the condition prohibiting “sexually oriented and
sexually stimulating” material is impermissibly broad and vague; as a result, it
creates notice and enforcement issues. This Note accordingly proposes that the
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” condition be separated and properly
defined. This proposal achieves two goals: (1) to properly define “sexually oriented”
and “sexually stimulating” material to provide sex offenders with notice and a
comprehensive understanding of the prohibition; and (2) to supply probation officers
with a guideline that ensures fairly and consistently enforced.
Sex offenders have unquestionably earned the negative reception from the
public and the resulting restrictions resulting from their actions. However, when an
offender, like Robert Dinapoli, is unaware that his actions are prohibited, it defeats
the purpose that specialized conditions of release. For rehabilitation to be effective,
the offender needs to be cognizant of his actions in relation to the conduct prohibited
by the various conditions. Only then can a sex offender acknowledge that he is on
the right side of the line, which will aid his decision-making when he is released back
into society.
Although it can be argued that creating a bright line definition, as proposed
here, will allow the sex offender to acknowledge the boundaries and “tip-toe” around
them, finding ways to continue their predatory agendas, the reality is that the
proposed definition is more restrictive in many ways than the existing condition. For
example, Dinapoli’s possession of the three mainstream DVDs would not have been
permissible. Unlike the existing standard, under the proposed definition, Dinapoli
would be unable to argue that notice was not provided. Probation officers will not be
granted the broad decision to enforce the condition, and instead will be limited to the
clear and bright lines within the proposed definition. This eliminates the use of
arbitrary enforcement. The offender does inherent a more restrictive standard to
abide by, but in exchange, the offender receives notice and the assurance that the
condition will be fairly and consistently enforced.
Admittedly, Section 6(A) is merely a portion of the Sex Offender
Behavioral Contract. Nevertheless, the definition proposed by this Note can
influence the construction of future conditions. More importantly, this proposal can
shed light on the severe consequences and lack of justice that sex offenders face
when they are forced to comply with broad and vague conditions.

